Abstract-Higher variable renewable generation penetrations are occurring throughout the world on different power systems. These resources increase the variability and uncertainty on the system which must be accommodated by an increase in the flexibility of the system resources in order to maintain reliability. Many scheduling strategies have been discussed and introduced to ensure that this flexibility is available at multiple timescales. To meet variability, that is, the expected changes in system conditions, two recent strategies have been introduced: time-coupled multi-period market clearing models and the incorporation of ramp capability constraints. To appropriately evaluate these methods, it is important to assess both efficiency and reliability. But it is also important to assess the incentive structure to ensure that resources asked to perform in different ways have the proper incentives to follow these directions, which is a step often ignored in simulation studies. We find that there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. We also find that look-ahead horizon length in multi-period market models can impact incentives. This paper proposes scheduling and pricing methods that ensure expected ramps are met reliably, efficiently, and with associated prices based on true marginal costs that incentivize resources to do as directed by the market. Case studies show improvements of the new method.
the level of reliability, while obeying system constraints at least production cost. These impacts have been studied to a great degree in a number of studies performed by researchers and industry [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Market design is typically not a primary focus of these studies; however, some market design recommendations have been introduced based on study results. For example, larger balancing areas or more frequent dispatch scheduling have been common market design recommendations from some studies [7] .
Variability and uncertainty both occur at multiple timescales (i.e., time resolutions and time horizons) [8] . Variability refers to the changing system conditions that are anticipated. Uncertainty refers to the system conditions that were not originally anticipated. Variability can cause issues when it occurs at time resolutions or time horizons that the system may not be able to respond to. Uncertainty can lead to issues when initial decisions were not correct or optimal. These impacts can certainly lead to degraded system reliability, but they can also lead to higher costs. Examples of reliability issues that variability and uncertainty cause include active power imbalance, which can lead to frequency deviations and area control error (ACE), and power flow changes, which can lead to line overloads. For example, an hourly day-ahead unit commitment model will eventually face uncertainty issues since load and VG output cannot be predicted perfectly a day in advance, and will face variability issues since the load and VG can vary significantly within the hour while the hourly schedules do not. Evaluation of both costs and reliability as metrics is crucial when evaluating the impacts of variability and uncertainty.
Since the restructuring of the electricity industry, markets have been designed to incentivize competition for providing energy and other services that support energy delivery and reliability. These complex markets integrate efficient economic principles with the engineering and physics of the power system [9] . In the United States, restructured markets have evolved toward a standard market design [10] . The general market design reflects a pool-based market where there exists a two-settlement system for day-ahead markets (DAM) and real-time markets (RTM), with co-optimized energy and active power ancillary services (AS, i.e., operating reserves), locational marginal pricing for energy, and financial transmission rights markets in place for hedging locational price volatility. As more VG is integrated, some aspects of these markets may need to be reevaluated [11] , [12] . There becomes an increased interest on how the market designs are incentivizing market participants to provide the flexibility to the market when needed [13] . Without these incentives, it will be a challenge to motivate resources to provide the flexibility to meet increased variability and uncertainty brought by VG.
Scheduling strategies have evolved in the new deregulated environment aiming to increase efficiency while maintaining a level of reliability. A suite of advanced scheduling models are integrated at different timescales to schedule and/or price energy and AS. These include day-ahead security-constrained unit commitment (DASCUC), intra-day SCUC (IDSCUC), real-time SCUC (RTSCUC), RT security-constrained economic dispatch (RTSCED), reserve pick up (RPU), and automatic generation control (AGC). RTMs now clear at 5-min intervals, allowing for more efficient and reliable operation to meet rapidly changing conditions. Co-optimization of energy and various AS allow for improved efficiency and pricing that incentivizes resources to provide the services most critical to meet reliability needs [14] . VG energy forecasting has been used in DAM and RTM to better predict VG outcomes [15] . Mixed integer programming has been introduced to solve large-scale problems with more accuracy, as well as to allow for easier modeling of detailed system and resource constraints [16] . Research has also evaluated the use of stochastic or robust scheduling models, to better model uncertainty in power systems, making more efficient decisions that can accommodate a number of potential outcomes [17] [18] [19] . Lastly, decision horizons of the scheduling models have been increased so that the future can be anticipated within the model and better decisions can be made in anticipation of future conditions [20] . These improvements have generally been shown, in theory, to improve efficiency and reduce production costs. However, the evolution of the market design that goes along with some of the strategies has not always been studied in great detail. If the incentive structure does not evolve with the scheduling strategies, these efficiency improvements may not be realizable in the long-term.
In many regards, variability is easier to accommodate than uncertainty. Since the changes are known, it can be scheduled for as long as the flexibility is available and resources are willing to provide it. It is possible that the capabilities of the supply mix are insufficient, and that even if the ramp required is known, the aggregate response speed is not capable of meeting it. When there is sufficient flexibility, the majority of expected variability that occurs on the system can usually be met explicitly through the previously discussed scheduling models. There are a few exceptions. First, it is possible that the variability is occurring at faster resolution than the scheduling model, and not enough information is available to meet this variability explicitly. Second, it is possible that the expected variability occurring in the future can affect the decisions that must be made now, and that information is beyond the scheduling horizon and not used within the scheduling model. It is possible that these two exceptions become a greater concern with increasing penetrations of VG. This paper focuses on the latter, expected future variability.
Previous papers have discussed the impacts of variability within scheduling resolutions [8] and scheduling and pricing due to uncertainty [21] . The contribution of this paper is the proposal of new market designs improving the scheduling and pricing of resources required to meet expected variability in a reliable, efficient, and incentive compatible manner. Section II describes characteristics of market models used to meet expected variability. Section III proposes new scheduling and pricing approaches. Section IV provides case studies that show the validity of the approaches compared to the existing market designs. Section V concludes.
II. MARKET MODELS TO MEET EXPECTED VARIABILITY
In pool-based electricity markets, the two common tools for clearing energy and AS for the DAM and RTM are the DASCUC and RTSCED, respectively. The formulation of the DASCUC model can be seen in [22] . It maximizes social welfare, or in cases of inelastic demand, minimizes total offered production costs. It does this while obeying a number of system constraints, including normal and contingency transmission constraints, individual unit ramping, capacity and commitment constraints, and system reserve and load demand constraints. In RTSCED, the commitments are fixed, and only the online units can be used to meet load and reserve demands.
There are two ways to prepare for future expected variability in these market models. The first is by using time-coupled multiperiod (TCMP) market models which consider future conditions to optimize immediate decisions. The second is to use a single period (SP) market model with ramp capability constraints which ensure the capacity and ramping capability will be available to meet the future expected variability. We now explore these two techniques with brief examples to show their characteristics.
A. Time-Coupled Multi-Period (TCMP) Market Models
The DASCUC in the DAM typically includes horizons of at least 24 h, at hourly time resolutions. The RTSCED in RTM typically includes 5-min time resolutions, and either SP or multiple periods. When the RTM uses TCMP RTSCED, the typical time horizon is 30 min to 1 h. Numerous algorithms have been used to efficiently solve the TCMP RTSCED [24] , [25] , and these models are now in existence or are being proposed in many electricity markets, including NYISO, CAISO, and SPP (see [20] , [23] , and [26] ).
The major advantage of using TCMP models versus SP is incorporation of the time-coupling constraints. For SCUC, this includes ramping rates, minimum on and off times, start-up times, and other commitment constraints. For SCED, this typically includes only the ramping constraints. The TCMP model has two direct benefits compared to the SP model. It can reduce infeasibilities (i.e., not being able to meet load or reserve requirements) which can have reliability (e.g., reduced ACE) and pricing implications (e.g., avoidance of price spikes). It can also reduce costs. The DAM will consider the first 24 h of schedules and prices as binding for settlement. While schedules and prices will be made for all intervals of the TCMP RTSCED model, the RTM will typically only consider the first time interval as binding for settlements, the rest being advisory. However, due to the time-coupling constraints, these future time intervals can influence both the scheduling and pricing of the first interval (hereon referred to as the binding interval as it is the only official interval used for scheduling and pricing), therefore affecting the operation and revenue of the market participants.
We give two short examples illustrating the advantages of TCMP RTSCED used for RTM, using the 3-generator example shown in Table I and the two, 2-interval (I1 and I2) load scenarios given in Table II , with interval resolution of 5 min. Tables III and IV give the results for each scenario.
Infeasibility occurs when the scheduling model is not able to meet the load, and this results in a large price spike from penalty/ scarcity prices (e.g., $1000/MWh). Price spikes are important in electricity markets as they can help encourage short-term reliability during shortage periods and incentivize long term investment in capacity. However, transient price spikes due to inefficient scheduling decisions are not true capacity scarcity condi- tions and thus should be avoided when possible. Table III shows that the TCMP model eliminates the infeasibility that occurred for the SP model, where it could not prepare for the ramp needed and did not meet load in I2. In this example, the TCMP model might improve reliability by reducing ACE/frequency excursions, and it would avoid the large price spike caused by the infeasibility. Table IV shows that while the TCMP model increased the costs of I1, it reduces total costs. This shows how the TCMP model is important for improved reliability, reduced price spikes, and reduced production costs.
B. Ramp Capability (RC) Requirement Constraints
The other option for meeting expected variability in RTSCED models in the RTM is for constraints that ensure that the capacity and ramp needed to meet future variability is reserved in current intervals. This method has been gaining some recent attention in some RTMs like CAISO and MISO [27] [28] [29] . It is important to note that these market regions are implementing these requirements for both variability and uncertainty. In [30] , a similar comparison to the one done here was performed for stochastic modeling versus constraints for uncertainty. While in practical systems, reserve requirements can be based on a number of different factors (see [31] ), the here is only to meet expected variability and therefore the requirement is straightforward matching the need exactly.
We use a single period ramp capability (SPRC) model. For the formulation, (1) shows the constraint enforced to ensure the expected variability can be met. Equations (2) and (3) show the maximum for each resource based on ramp rate and interval length, and share of power schedule with max capacity. Equation (4) shows how the for expected variability (upward direction) is calculated. Net load is calculated in this paper as the load minus VG: Table II , except the need in I1 is used to ensure I2 can be met rather than modeling I2 explicitly as is done in TCMP. Generators of Table I are used.
Table VI shows the energy and schedules for both scenarios when using a SPRC model. In Scenario 1, the schedules and production costs are identical to the TCMP model (Table III) . However, in Scenario 2, the schedules and production costs follow the SP model (Table IV) . What this shows is that the SPRC model is likely to maintain a similar level of reliability and avoidance of price spikes as the TCMP model, but may not be as efficient at reducing costs. This is due to the deployment of the not being part of the objective function (see [30] ).
C. Incentive Compatibility Comparison
Next we compare the incentive structures of TCMP models against SPRC models. Note that using (4) is essential to ensure the RC requirement is for expected variability only and that a consistent comparison between the two models can be made. The is the total marginal cost (at all locations and time periods) of meeting the next increment of demand for the specific time period and specific location. It is also defined as the shadow price (i.e., dual variable) of the nodal energy balance constraint, or the partial derivative of the Lagrange Function with respect to an incremental load change [32] . We show this in (5) . Similarly, a reserve clearing price can be calculated as the dual variable of the reserve inequality constraint. This method is also how markets introducing RC products are pricing this new product, where RC clearing price uses its dual variable . When no external bid-costs are allowed for reserve products and energy and reserve products are co-optimized, the price for reserve is purely based on the lost opportunity cost. This has generally been proven as a means for a least cost, incentive compatible, profit-maximizing solution where resources are indifferent to which service they provide ( [33] ):
As discussed in Section II-A, in market areas that use TCMP in the RTM, only the first interval price is binding in settlements. Using Scenario 1 which had identical schedule/cost results for TCMP and SPRC, Table VII shows prices, costs, revenues, and profits for TCMP and SPRC. The TCMP model results in an of $30/MWh in I1, and $130/MWh in I2 of the first, two-period solution. Using Table III , if the load of I2 is changed by an infinitesimally small amount, G3 would adjust in both I1 and I2, with G2 adjusting oppositely in I1 to balance. This equates to an of MWh). However, when I2 becomes the first and binding interval, the will be different even without any change in conditions. The simulation results in primal degeneracy which can result in multiple prices of either $80/MWh or the penalty price. According to [34] , the price in this situation typically results in the lower value, but this is not proven. Since I1 is now in the past, the optimization does not use its schedules as decision variables and so its costs do not affect the . Alternatively, the is nonzero due to the lost opportunity costs resulting from G2 providing RC rather than energy.
A similar instance can happen with downward ramps when comparing to downward reserve requirements. In this case however, the price in the advisory interval at the end of the down ramp may go significantly low and even negative. But when that interval is then the binding interval, it may no longer be as low. For example, a load change from 100 to 70 MW with the generators of Table I would cause LMPs of $80 in I1 and negative $40 in I2. When I2 is binding, the price would be $20. The negative $20 price in I2 would incent the cheaper generators to stay backed down in I1 to avoid financial loss in I2. However, knowing that the price would actually be $20 ($40 higher) might cause different behavior from the most optimal. On the other hand, the same scenario with downward , would cause a $20 energy price (rather than $80) in I1 with a $60 downward , providing incentives for the more expensive units to supply energy above cost so that they can provide lucrative downward . Without a RC constraint, there is no dual variable for providing ramp in the TCMP model, or it is lost in the advisory intervals and never settled upon. When ramping up and when both the SPRC and the TCMP have identical production results, the TCMP will always have RTM revenues less than or equal to the SPRC model. This is because 1) the SPRC treats the ramp need independently of the energy need whereas the TCMP ramp need is dependent on the energy need and 2) because the dual variable of inequality constraints must be positive. In Table VII , if the load in I2 was higher than expected, both the SPRC and TCMP would result equally in the penalty price in I2 and so overall the SPRC would still result in overall higher revenue than TCMP due to revenue differences in I1.
D. Importance of Look-Ahead Horizon Length
We now explore one more example to describe another pricing phenomenon that occurs with TCMP market models. We show the Lagrange function (6) for this example in general form for TCMP. We ignore ramp down and focus on upward ramping. In (7), we show the Karush-Kuhn Tucker relationship, where the partial derivative of the Lagrange with respect to a variable is equal to zero (now ignoring network effects). Finally, we show how this allows us to determine the value of for TCMP in (8): (8) In this scenario, the load goes from 100 MW in I1 to 129 MW in I2 with the same generation as Table I . The shadow price results are shown in Table VIII with the right-most columns showing the , as calculated by (8) . In this case, the price from I1, would become binding, and the resources who are ramp constrained would pay money for supplying energy in I1. Negative prices are not uncommon, as many areas have had occurrences of negative prices due to transmission constraints and minimum generation constraints [35] , [36] . However, negative prices due to ramp constraints have not been discussed much in the literature or industry. While it appears that the negative price would be harming the generators who are online during I1, it actually may not be so. If G1 provides 90 MW during I1, it is able then to ramp to its full capacity in I2 to take advantage of the high price and make maximum profit. Note that the higher ramp rate that G1 and G2 have, the less they would be susceptible to the negative price of I1, while still receiving the benefit of the high price of I2 (although the lumpiness involved with nonconvex costs does not make this always true). If G1 had a ramp rate of 3 MW/min rather than 2 MW/min, it would have been scheduled at 85 MW in I1, and it would receive $2600 of profit vs. $2400.
If we now model the same scenario but with a horizon of 3, 5-min intervals, the prices come up as shown in Table IX for three different scenarios of the load in interval 3.
The I1 price, the only interval that is used for settlements, depends on horizon length. This begs the question of how far ahead should the RTM look forward. This could have significant consequences especially in systems with increased amounts of long duration ramp events from increased VG.
III. NEW MARKET DESIGN PROPOSALS
From the discussion in Section II, several observations can be made. These are listed below:
• Both TCMP and SPRC will contribute to avoiding ramp related price spikes and potential reliability issues compared to SP model without RC constraints, by ensuring ramping capacity is available.
• TCMP models will produce more cost efficient solutions compared to SPRC as the deployment of the ramping capability is minimized in addition to the holding of that capacity.
• SPRC tends to price ramp capacity in a manner that more appropriately incentivizes resources to follow directions compared to TCMP models. • Negative energy prices can occur due to ramp periods in TCMP models which can correctly incentivize flexibility (especially demand response).
• The length of look-ahead horizon in TCMP models will have a significant impact on the pricing that occurs in the binding interval during ramp periods. In this section we propose two new market designs aimed at improving efficiency, reliability, and incentive compatibility.
A. Appropriate Incentives for Meeting Expected Variability
The best option for meeting expected variability appears to be combining the efficiency of TCMP with the pricing structure of constraints. The crucial issue is that when future intervals affect the schedules of current intervals, the pricing must incentivize resources to perform as directed. If this is not done or guaranteed, resources will not be incentivized to assist during ramping periods or they may be incentivized to provide false offer information (e.g., offer costs or ramp rate information). Note that by just combining the two, a TCMP market model with constraints (again constraints here are strictly for expected variability needs and not uncertainty), this will cause the constraints to be nonbinding with zero prices. The schedules will also likely be different than the schedules of the future intervals in TCMP and can cause discrepancies between pricing and scheduling due to deployments not being part of the objective function, difficulties in incorporating nodal power flow into reserve requirements, and inclusion of start-up and shut-down movements among other unique constraints. So the simple combination of TCMP model with constraints is not a desirable option. Another option would be to include all the look-ahead intervals as binding for settlement. Prices based on the dual solution of a multi-period model (like the DAM) have been generally proven to be incentive compatible. However, this would be a very big market design change for the RTM since the RTM is designed to create prices and schedules based only on the binding decisions that are being made and not on advisory decisions.
We propose the cross interval marginal price concept. Since we have already determined that the equivalent to having incentive compatibility for the SPRC model is the , we start with the shown in (5). Since the is for a single time-period, we can express (5) in terms of the objective function for the binding interval. We can assume that the only cost to providing are lost opportunity costs: (9) We now substitute with (4) ignoring the zero term:
Since in SPRC, the term of the binding interval is part of the load balance constraint, it is only the of which can change to increase the . Also, since many markets now allow renewable curtailment, we can change of that interval to Load only. We also generalize as the can be for intervals beyond the second interval. This gives us (11) , which is the . Both and are the change in energy cost of the binding interval due to the ramp needed to get to the next interval:
The can only be nonzero in SCED when ramp constraints are binding, since there are no other coupling constraints across intervals. 1 Since the future demand is impacting the binding schedules, there must be incentives for resources to act now in order to meet the expected variability when there is no guarantee that the incentives will be there in the future. Since is referring to energy schedules, it must be treated similar to revenues from RTM energy schedules, where the difference in the advisory interval from the associated DA interval is paid the . This is seen in (12) . Any additional revenues would be covered by loads in a similar manner to energy and since can be locational, the allocation can be based on location of loads as well. Note that since all intervals in the DAM are settled upon, there is no need for in the DAM. Also in a mixed integer programming SCUC problem, the dual solution is determined after fixing the integer variables to the primal solution. So the solution of for SCUC would be the same as in the SCED. Other concepts like nonconvex pricing (see [38] ) can be incorporated here as well, but are not explored here: (12) The calculation of can be performed with the dual variables that result from the TCMP model dual solution. Looking at (8) , the difference of the of the look-ahead interval to when it becomes the binding interval, is of of the resource that would be needed to increase in the look-ahead interval (i.e., the shadow price of the unit's ramp constraint between I1 and I2). This would be the same as the cost of the marginal provider in the SPRC model. is nonzero when the demand of a future interval affects the costs of the first interval. For this to happen, the marginal cost of the future interval must not be based on an individual's cost in that interval. Its marginal cost would include the operational costs of all intervals before it. The model used here has a marginal unit calculator, which can present the marginal resources for every interval. This is shown in Step 1 of Fig. 1 , where dual variables of various constraints can show whether the resource is marginal ( if unit is marginal; for brevity, a subset of dual variables used are shown in Fig. 1 ). The number of constrained lines ( if constraint of line is binding) must also be determined. In Step 2, it must be found if there is an interval where prices are not caused directly by a marginal resource in that interval due to missing marginal resources. For that future interval to affect the costs of the first interval as shown in (11) there must be time-coupling constraints between the intervals. This is shown in Step 3, where if exists, it must be found if there is a link across that interval to the binding interval , where a resource, , is ramp constrained from to . Finally in Step 4, and only if and exist, the for the bus where is located is calculated as the dual variable of the ramp constraint for from . This is derived from (6) and gives the true value of the change in costs from schedules of due to an increase in demand in at the location of . In Fig. 1 , we follow the formulation of (6). Other dual variables including ramp down constraints are also in the solution but not shown in Fig. 1 .
Following
Step 4, a price for one location is known. Due to network impacts including network congestion and losses, the CIMP can differ at different locations on the network. With no transmission constraints, the values for other buses are fairly straightforward. This is shown in (13) for the case of nondistributed slack bus (index is used for ). For look-ahead intervals where lines are congested, a set of equations is used. Since all units that are marginal in the look-ahead interval have a of 0 and the at the location of is equal to , an equal amount of equations and unknowns allow for solution of at the reference bus and , which is the marginal cost of the first interval due to the binding constraint in the look-ahead interval (14) . For example, in the case of one binding transmission constraint, these can be solved via (15) and (16) (17) shows how the is determined for all buses for the general case. Note that (17) and (13) are identical for non-congested systems: (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) Table X shows a brief example to illustrate the network-constrained for the PJM 5-bus system [39] with one wind generator at Bus E (costs shown in Table XIV ). The table shows the delivery factor of Scenario 1 and shift factor to the constrained branch in Scenario 2 (delivery factor is slightly different in Scenario 2). The for a 2-interval horizon are shown as I1 and I2 for two consecutive market runs in each case, followed by the calculated . In Scenario 1, there is no congestion, but the marginal losses affect the location-based . In this scenario, Brighton (Bus E) must ramp across I1 and I2 such that the wind is curtailed in I1 to account for the load balance. In Scenario 2, there is congestion, and since only one unit (Solitude at Bus D) is marginal in I2, there is nonzero . Brighton is ramping from I1 to I2 in this case. At Bus D there is a zero as an increment in load in I2 at 18:25 would not affect I1 as Solitude could provide without impact to the congested line or need for change in dispatch in I1.
The provides a payment mechanism similar to a reserve price, but for a type of reserve that is being scheduled inherently within the scheduling model. Therefore, it is achieving a similar result to prices. The is simply the mechanism to provide the incentive for the more efficient TCMP solution where the price does not exist. The would result in analogous revenues to SPRC when production results are identical but provide more granularity by giving locationspecific incentives. This method would result in a of $50/MWh for the TCMP model in Table III and Table VII , resulting in identical revenue and profits to SPRC constraints (ignoring in (12)).
B. Look-Ahead Horizon Length
When the future conditions are known but left out of the TCMP market model, the prices may not reflect true marginal cost. However, as the RTM must be solved very quickly to provide a solution every five minutes, excessive horizons are also not practical. Some happy medium is desired.
We propose a dynamic look-ahead horizon (DLAH). Since ramp constraints are the only constraint linking intervals in RTSCED, when a ramp constraint does not continue to an interval from the second interval, there is no way that it can affect the binding prices or schedules. Therefore, the final interval of the DLAH can be determined by (18) . Start-up and shut-down ramp rates can be added as well. In our design we include a few high time resolution (e.g., 5 min) look-ahead intervals before looking ahead to :
C. Uncertainty Impacts
As discussed throughout this paper, the focus of these enhancements are to more efficiently schedule and price decisions based on expected variability. References [21] and [30] provide similar analyses toward methods to appropriately schedule and price decisions with increased uncertainty. In both the and DLAH, the focus is on the pricing that influences the binding settlement interval. While there is uncertainty between the RTM clearing and the first interval end point, this is typically covered by AGC regulation and governor control. The dispatch and ramp capability provision of the first interval are binding decisions that are made regardless of the presence of the uncertainty. Moreover, only focusing on expected variability is required for an apples to apples comparison between TCMP and . The presence of uncertainty can affect the future look-ahead intervals, and when incorporating methods like stochastic optimization or increased reserve, can influence the decision of the binding interval. But there still will always be deterministic binding decisions regardless of how uncertainty is met. This makes both and DLAH applicable with or without uncertainty. The combination of these methods with uncertainty and advanced scheduling strategies should be studied in the future to see how these methods influence results.
IV. CASE STUDIES
Two case studies are performed. We study TCMP, SP, and SPRC models and in Section IV-A. We then study the impact of negative pricing and DLAH in Section IV-B.
A. Cross Interval Marginal Price (CIMP)
In this case study, we now simulate the RTS96 single area system [40] using the FESTIV model [8] , [41] . FESTIV is a research tool that integrates SCUC, SCED, and AGC models at configurable time-based parameters to simulate full scheduling operations. It is able to produce results for costs, reliability, and revenues. We simulate this system for the same 1-week period using four scenarios: SC1, using SP model; SC2, using SPRC, where is from (4); SC3, using TCMP with a horizon of 6 total 5-min intervals; and SC4, same as SC3 but with . In order to have an equal comparison between SC2 and SC3/SC4, there are 5 RC constraints for up and down directions. Each of these represents the expected variability need at 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 minutes following the first interval.
The RTS96 details can be found in [40] . Piecewise linear costs are calculated from fuel costs and heat rates from [40] broken into four segments. Ramp rates and start-up times, also from [40] are shown in Table XI . In this study, FESTIV is utilizing a daily DASCUC with 24-h horizon, 15-min RTSCUC with 3-h horizon, 5-min RTSCED with horizon depending on scenario, and 4-s AGC. In all sub-models, a perfect forecast is used for both load and VG (4s data from NREL dataset). Load and VG is shown in Fig. 2 . A perfect forecast is equal to the realized load and VG, averaged over the corresponding sub-model resolution. No other reserve types are added in the simulations (outside of RC in SC2). Transmission constraints are also ignored.
We first analyze benefits of TCMP against other models in Table XII . Results show total production costs (normalized with respect to inadvertent interchange), number and percent of RTM price spikes due to infeasibilities in the RTSCED, standard deviation of ACE, and absolute ACE in energy (sum of ACE, positive or negative, in units of MWh, AACEE).
Results generally follow trends and expectations from Section II. SC3 and SC4 are identical for reliability and efficiency since the is only calculated following each interval and does not directly affect dispatch. SC2 performed worse in reliability and in number of price spikes compared to SC3/SC4 but performed much better than SC1. The costs of SC2 were also higher than SC3/SC4 since the ramping capability costs of deployment are not considered. It is difficult to find a metric to show the importance of .
A new design can be tested with incentive compatibility, meaning all participants fare best when they offer into the market truthfully. However, slight adjustments might be required to present the comparison. According to ISO-NE, 2 the total revenue from the RTM relates to about 5% of the DAM, and AS revenues relate to about 0.6% of energy. is similar to AS, where only 1.5% of RTSCED intervals had nonzero . It is also only in the RTM, meaning that any metrics looking at total revenue to show difference of will be lost in the noise. Therefore, we ignore DAM revenues when calculating total revenues in the comparison. We then look at unit-intervals at a 5-min level where a unit has negative profit, meaning its incentive for that interval is not aligned with the direction the ISO gave it, and depending on settlements rules could lead to uplift. It also means that it does not benefit from offering truthful costs and physical attributes (ramp rates). Thus, it leads to a design that may not be incentive compatible. There are a multitude of reasons that might cause profits to be negative having to do with commitment constraints and the fact that current prices do not incorporate nonconvex costs (e.g., no load and start-up costs) [42] . Therefore, we also make necessary modifications to eliminate these other reasons for negative profits. Table XIII shows overall results, those where no-load costs are eliminated from total costs calculation, and those where no-load costs are eliminated and all unit-intervals where the unit is at and unable to reduce output are eliminated. In total, there are 70 560 overall unit-intervals in the one-week study. in ($/MWh) for one-week study on the RTS system (SC4).
TABLE XIV PJM 5-BUS SYSTEM MODIFIED GENERATOR CHARACTERISTICS
Once eliminating no-load costs from total costs, and then eliminating unit-intervals where the unit is at it can be seen that the reduces the number of times a unit is being directed to perform something at a loss of revenue by half. Remaining negative profit unit-intervals can result from other conditions. The one-week that result from SC4 are shown in Fig. 3 .
B. Dynamic Look-Ahead Horizon (DLAH)
We now perform a case study using the modified PJM 5-bus system [39] and one day operation using FESTIV to show negative pricing, importance of look-ahead horizon length, and use of DLAH. The generator characteristics have been modified as seen in Table XIV . These modifications were made to exemplify a hypothetical number of cheap but inflexible units and a expensive highly flexible unit and how the look-ahead horizon may impact pricing. Other characteristics can be seen in [39] and [41] . We continue to use perfect forecasts, and ignore transmission and reserve constraints to focus on expected variability.
We use a fictitious load, which is flat from hours 0:00-13:30, then has a fast ramp of 2.5 MW/min from 13:30-17:00, and flat again, but at a higher load level, from 17:00-23:59. Fig. 4 shows the load profile. This fictitious example should be able to clearly show the importance of negative prices and look-ahead on pricing without other factors influencing results. Also, this ramp period might be similar to a VG event, for example [43] .
We use the same timing parameters as Section IV-A, with the 5-min RTSCED using varying horizon. The DAM are shown in Fig. 5 . The negative at $ 252/MWh occurs at the start of the ramp period. This means that marginal savings of $252 can be made if the load increased at the start of this period to reduce the ramp requirement.
We now compare five scenarios of look-ahead horizon in the RTM. No horizon (5-min SP), 1-h horizon (12, 5-min intervals), 3-h horizon (2 hourly intervals added to 1-h horizon), 5-h horizon (2 hourly intervals added to 3-h horizon), and the DLAH (12 5-min intervals followed by the DLAH).
What changes in these scenarios, are the prices associated with the start of the ramp. In other words, the better the interval knows the future and how long the ramp will affect costs, the better it can price the interval based on its true marginal cost. With perfect forecasts, and without variability occurring between the DAM interval resolution and the RTM interval resolution, prices, schedules, and therefore revenues should be identical. In Fig. 6 , we compare the DAM revenue with each of the five RTM scenarios. The RTM normalized revenues in this case are simply based on the RTM schedules and prices and not the differences from the DAM.
The revenues in the RTM do not match those in the DAM until the DLAH is used. It evaluated a 9.5-h look-ahead horizon at the start of the ramp due to the current output of Brighton and the amount of time it would take for it to reach . The 5-min during the start of the ramp is $ 3132/MWh in the DLAH scenario. This is about 12 times higher than the price seen in the DAM, which reflects the hourly to 5-min interval resolution. This large negative price can incentivize units to decommit or demand to increase, resulting in better market equilibrium and leading to more efficient solutions.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper describes the ways in which to schedule and price energy and services with increasing levels of expected variability. We show through simple examples that the TCMP RTM model performs better for efficiency and likely equal for reliability and price spike reduction compared to the SPRC model, but that it may lack incentives during ramp periods. The crossinterval marginal price incentivizes resources when they are asked to provide a schedule now in order to meet expected variability in the future. The paper also explored the ways that ramp events can cause negative energy prices and the impact the lookahead horizon length has on pricing. A dynamic look-ahead horizon is proposed which guarantees that information is being used properly to price the binding settlement interval based on true marginal costs.
Whenever proposing new scheduling strategies or market designs, we must ensure that they can be adapted on large practical systems. Time-coupled multi-period dispatch is more difficult to solve than single-period models and slightly more than single period with RC constraints. However, the TCMP model has already been implemented in numerous regions (e.g., CAISO, NYISO) and therefore proven feasible for large practical systems. The scheme is a pricing rule which does not affect the scheduling solution and which has negligible computational impacts. Finally, since the DLAH is simply dictating the point at which the final look-ahead horizon point will be, this will generally not affect the solution time any differently than TCMP without DLAH with the same number of decision points.
While we focused on the issues of meeting expected variability, the impacts that come from uncertainty are likely to be greater. Uncertainty can be met with additional reserve and RC requirements, or more explicitly with stochastic programming or other scenario-based scheduling applications. When comparing these different methods, it is crucial that an apples-to-apples comparison is made in order to make appropriate conclusions. We believe that the issues of variability and uncertainty should be studied simultaneously in future studies, after a better understanding of each is made.
We believe that further studies can show whether both and DLAH could be implemented in existing markets today. Due to their simplicity and their evident fixing of current flaws, the software improvements and regulatory changes required are relatively straightforward. On the other hand, it may be that these issues are not as critical on current systems, but may become so in future systems with increased VG penetrations that can increase the impacts of ramp events.
